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Introduction

At the United Nation's global climate change
conference in Geneva on July 17, 1996, State Department officials suddenly reversed the U.S.
government's long-standing policy on global climate
change. Speaking before the Assembly of Delegates,
Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy E. Wirth announced, "The United States recommends that future negotiations focus on an
agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable and binding medium-term emissions target" 1 (emphasis
added). Until then, the United States had rejected
compulsory emissions controls.
Only 10 of the nation's 53 major daily newspapers thought the announcement important enough
to cover. 2 But, if government officials have their
way, this sudden reversal in U.S. global climate
change policy could dramatically affect the life of
every American. After the debate ends, binding
emissions standards could cost the United States
enormous amounts of wealth and, perhaps, some of
its sovereignty.
If the more stringent proposals become international law, the United States' economic growth
could slow to a crawl. An economic study sponsored by the Global Climate Coalition (an industrysponsored watchdog group) projects a 3 to 3.5
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percent drag on the American economy, which has
recently grown only around 2.5 percent a year. 3
If America's corporations had to meet an international emissions standard, an international agency
would be necessary to set the standard and to enforce its implementation. Setting a just and equitable standard would prove an extremely difficult
undertaking given the different economic circumstances and natural resources of each nation. State
Department officials have publicly stated their doubt
that a common measure could judiciously apply to
all countries. 4

History of Negotiations

For the standard to be binding, this regulating
agency must have the power to punish businesses,
governments, and other organizations that fail to
meet the targets. This is a frightening prospect for
industries and localities that already wade through
bureaucracies and regulations imposed by their own
federal and state governments. If this new agenda
were to become international law, a substantial
amount of regulatory power would shift from individual nations to a global governing agency.
It might be argued, however, that the seriousness of the threat to the earth's ecosystem requires
this tremendous cost. Perhaps the present generation has a responsibility to future generations to take
these steps. This may, or may not be, the case.
The costs and benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation
have yet to be properly debated by the American
public and its governmental representatives. The
environmental and economic implications are too
significant to let the issue be decided without substantial public debate.

The global climate change issue is of fairly recent origin. It was not until the late 1980s, when
reports implicated human activity for the depletion
of the ozone layer, that much of the public came to
believe that human action could indeed affect the
atmosphere. In 1988, the coupling of a Midwestern drought and a congressional hearing chaired by
then-U.S. Senator Timothy Wirth forced the issue
to the fore. At that hearing, prominent climatologist James Hansen testified that he was "99 percent" sure that global warming was occurring. 5
That same year, the United Nations and the
World Meteorological Organization established the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
They designed the IPCC to provide a "consensus"
scientific perspective on global climate change and
to scientifically inform the decisions of policymakers.
In 1990, 154 nations organized themselves as the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to
develop a worldwide treaty in response to IPCC
analyses of climate change. 6
In 1992, environmental ministers meeting under United Nations auspices produced a "treaty"
document called the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC) at the U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.
That document has provided the foundation for all
subsequent U.N. conferences on global climate
change. To date 159 countries have signed the
Framework Convention, including the United States.
Approving the Framework Convention gives countries membership in the Conference of Parties which,
in turn, gives them a seat at the table in future climate negotiations.
The Framework Convention imposes two key
stipulations on member nations. First, it calls for
capping greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.
Second, it requires a periodic report on each nation's
net emissions of greenhouse gases. The exact language (Article 4) of the Framework Convention states,
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The costs and benefits of greenhouse gas
mitigation have yet to be properly
debated by the American public and its
governmental representatives.

Each of these Parties shall communicate . . . detailed
information on . . . projected anthropogenic emissions . . . with the aim of returning individually or
jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 7

Noticeably absent from this statement, and the entire document, are both a time frame for attaining
1990 emissions levels and mechanisms to enforce
the emissions target.
Domestic Action

In response to the goal set forth in the Framework Convention, the Clinton administration unveiled its $1.9 billion Climate Change Action Plan
in October 1993. When introducing the plan on
the White House lawn, President Clinton said,
On Earth Day I made a commitment to reduce our
emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the
year 2000 . . . . In concert with all other nations,
we simply must halt global warming. It is a threat
to our health, to our ecology and to our economy. 8

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has affirmed his department's role in supporting this global environmental policy. In his Earth Day 1996
address at Stanford University, he said:
Our administration has recognized from the beginning
that our ability to advance our global interests is
inextricably linked to how we manage the Earth's
resources. That is why we are determined to put
environmental issues where they belong: in the
mainstream of American foreign policy. 9

Despite the strength of these statements from
the Clinton administration, Under Secretary Wirth's
stance at the Geneva Conference of Parties surprised
both environmental groups and industry. Until that
day, U.S. officials had resisted any measures beyond voluntary restrictions.
In fact, just a month before the Geneva conference, a senior State Department official had denied
even the possibility of universal standards and bind4

ing emissions targets in his testimony before the
House Subcommittee on Energy and Power. On
June 19, 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment and Development Rafe Pomerance said,
In our view, the significant differences in national
circumstances and individual national approaches to
these matters suggest that few, if any, individual
measures are likely to be applicable to all countries
. . . . We do not intend to make any quantitative
commitments or support any policy measures. 10

Less than a month later in Geneva, Under Secretary Wirth reversed this position by announcing
the U.S.'s support for a drastic new policy measure. Wirth declared, "Let me make clear the U.S.
view: The science calls upon us to take urgent action . . . . We believe that circumstances warrant
the adoption of a realistic but binding target. " 11
The Science

The source of this compelling science is the
IPCC's Second Assessment Report. Interestingly,
this May 1996 report scales back projections of global warming from the IPCC's 1990 Assessment
Report. The 1990 report projected global warming
of 3.5 to 8 degrees Celsius by the year 2050. The
1996 assessment estimates a warming effect of 1. 8
to 6.3 degrees Celsius by 2100_12
However, the Second Assessment Report also
contains a statement which has galvanized
policymakers and to which Under Secretary Wirth
appeals. The report states:
Our ability to quantify the human influence on global climate is currently limited because the expected
signal is still emerging from the noise of natural variability, and because there are uncertainties in key
factors. These include the magnitude and patterns
of long-term natural variability and the time-evolving pattern of forcing by, and response to, changes in
concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and
land surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of

evidence suggests that there is a discernible human
influence on global climate. (emphasis added) 13

5

When the IPCC published this report, several
prominent scientists cried, "Foul!" Led by Dr.
Frederick Seitz, former president of the National
Academy of Sciences, these critics claim that the
leaders of the IPCC altered the technical report after it had garnered approval from its scientific board
of advisors. 14 Dr. Benjamin D. Santer, lead author
of the report, replied that the alterations were purely
cosmetic, made only to provide a better summary
for policymakers. Dr. Santer maintained that the
essence and substance of the report was unchanged.

At least 25 percent of experts believe,
despite a lack of evidence, that
global warming is occurring.

Dr. Santer's response has not silenced the critics. They continue to claim that the "cosmetic"
changes significantly altered the report. They note
the deletion of such statements as, "None of the
studies cited above has shown clear evidence that
we can attribute the observed changes to the specific cause of increases in greenhouse gases." 15
Moreover, in the final editing new statements were
inserted, such as, "The observed trend in global
mean temperature over the past 100 years is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin. " 16
The critics' charges raise special concern in view
of the tendency of some scientists to overstate the
threat of global warming. In 1991, the Gallup organization polled a random sample of 400 climatologists and atmosphericists. Only a minority of
those surveyed, 41 percent, agreed with the statement that "currently available scientific evidence
substantiates its [global warming's] occurrence. " 17
Nevertheless, a clear majority of the respondents,
66 percent, affirmed their belief in the occurrence
of global warming. Thus, at least 25 percent of these
experts believe, despite a lack of evidence, that glo6

hal warming is occurring. Apparently, even scientists are swayed by nonscientific beliefs.
Why would such a large percentage of scientists respond in this nonscientific way? A benign
explanation is that taking such a position represents
the triumph of the heart over the mind. Another
theory is that of Dr. Richard S. Lindzen, a distinguished astrophysicist at M .1. T., who notes that
potential financial support encourages many scientists to support the global warming theory. He says
that this bias is "unconscious" and even "natural. " 18
Seitz and his colleagues at the George Marshall
Institute offered a similar explanation before the
House Committee on Science, saying:
Fundamental research on global climate change can
become entangled with the temptation to support preordained answers that may be linked to the process
of securing continuing funding. This perversion of
the scientific process could undermine the most important element of research in global climate change:
obtaining the best affordable research on the fundamental physics of global climate. 19

Harvard planetary scientist Charles L. Harper,
Jr. contends that, "the scientific 'consensus' the
[IPCC] report presents may have more to do with
the politics of fear than with objective science. " 20
This wide-ranging criticism of the IPCC report calls
into question the supposed "scientific consensus"
that the report is designed to provide.
The Geneva Conference of Parties,

july 1996
The Geneva Conference of Parties in July 1996
used the 1996 IPCC report as its scientific foundation. After 10 days of deliberations, the conference
produced a two-page ministerial declaration which
endorses the IPCC report and affirms the need for
binding timetables. The declaration garnered approval by a large majority of participating nations
but was never put to a vote.
Fourteen nations, many of them members of
7

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), vociferously contested the ministerial declaration due to its affirmation of the IPCC report
and its stance on binding emissions targets. 21 The
ministerial declaration uses the IPCC report's language to state, "The balance of evidence suggests a
discernible human influence on global climate. " 22
United States delegates played a large part in
writing the declaration, but some U.S. officials desired an even stronger statement. Assistant Secretary of State Eileen Claussen stated,
[The U.S.] wholeheartedly endorses this declaration
and agrees that we must now move faster and set
legally binding targets in Kyoto [location of the next
Conference of Parties meeting]. We could have gone
farther. 23
Emboldened by the IPCC report and the near
consensus of support, ministers called on their governments to "instruct their representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding
protocol or another legal instrument to be completed
in due time for adoption at tt.~ third session of the
Conference of the Parties [in December 1997]. " 24

percent of its gross domestic product, or $350 billion a year in reduced production of goods and services.
Some of the most significant effects cannot be
expressed in dollar terms. For example, Horwitz
projects that 520,000 jobs would be lost each year
from 1995 to 2010 under a $100-a-ton carbon tax.
Under a carbon tax of $200 a ton, the American
economy would lose an average of 1.1 million jobs
annually over that 15-year period. 26

If a carbon tax fell solely on
industrialized nations and not on
developing nations, total worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions would be
likely to rise, not fall.

A legally binding protocol to restrict carbon
emissions, whatever its form, will have substantial
impacts on the American economy. Economist
William Nordhaus of Yale University estimates that
emissions stabilization at 1990 levels, as proposed
by the Framework Convention, would generate a
net discounted cost of $7 trillion. 25
Dr. Lawrence Horwitz of the economic consulting firm DRI/McGraw Hill analyzed the annual
economic effect of greenhouse gas mitigation. He
estimates that a carbon tax of $100 a ton, which
could lower emissions levels to near 1990 levels,
would cost the American economy $203 billion each
year. According to his calculations, a $200-a-ton
carbon tax (which would ensure emissions below
1990 levels) would cost the American economy 4.2

Some proposals seek to limit greenhouse gas
emissions even further. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) believes that its member countries will face grave danger from rising ocean levels
if global warming occurs. Therefore, they have proposed that by 2005 developed countries stabilize
their emissions at 20 percent below 1990 levels. To
accomplish this aim, carbon taxes would need to be
in excess of $280 a ton. According to economic
consultants for the Global Climate Coalition, this
would cost the U.S. economy $262 billion to $305
billion each year. 27
Whichever means of curtailing carbon emissions
is used, limiting emissions will degrade living standards. Moreover, if a carbon tax fell solely on industrialized nations and not on developing nations,
as is currently the plan in every protocol before the
Framework Convention, total worldwide greenhouse
gas emissions would be likely to rise, not fall. If
emission reduction standards become law in industrialized nations, total consumption of carbon-emitting goods will fall. Thus, the price of goods such
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Emission Reduction Costs

as oil is likely to substantially decline on the world
market. However, the lower prices of these goods
would encourage poorer developing countries - with
much less fuel efficient technology - to increase
their use of fossil fuels, resulting in a net increase
in greenhouse gas emissions. 28
Moreover, as the world becomes increasingly
industrialized over the next century, the United
States' share of greenhouse gas emissions is expected
to shrink from 20 percent to 10 percent. Economists estimate that by the year 2100 the developing
countries of the world will be emitting three-quarters of the earth's greenhouse gases. 29
Yet the current deliberations on global warming policy ignore these facts. The United Kingdom's
most recent proposal states,
We believe that agreement by developed countries to
reduce total greenhouse gas emissions by a figure in
the range of 5-10 percent below the 1990 base year
by 2010 would be a credible and appropriate outcome
of the Berlin Mandate process. 30

The developing countries of the world continue to
bear no responsibilities under these protocols.
Under the Berlin Mandate, adopted in April
1995 by the major industrialized countries, responsibility to stop greenhouse gas emissions is markedly different for developed than for developing
countries. The developed, industrialized nations
(known as "Annex 1 Participants to the Framework
Convention") are the 27 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) plus the former Communist bloc countries.
Developing countries have no binding commitments
at all. Proposals that ignore the role of developing
countries will place severe economic strains on developed nations while achieving negligible net decreases in worldwide emission levels.
Should We Buy "Greenhouse Insurance?"

urgently strengthening action at the global, regional
and national levels. " 31 Indeed, it seems intuitive
that action should be taken now against this colossal threat. Yet there are important reasons to proceed with caution. A study by Douglas Holtz-Eakin
and Thomas Selden of Syracuse University finds
that the marginal propensity to emit carbon shrinks
as economies grow and develop. According to their
report, if economies continue to grow at their present
rates, the annual emissions growth will fall from its
1955-85 average of 3.2 percent a year to 1.8 percent annually for the period 1990-2025. 32 Thus,
any efforts which limit economic growth unwittingly
slow down progress toward carbon emissions reduction.
And a report by T. Wigley, R. Richels, and J.
Edmonds in the scientific journal Nature notes that
it is far less costly to allow emissions to rise for a
decade or more prior to restricting greenhouse gas
emissions. They give three reasons for their conclusion:
1. Positive marginal productivity of capital. With
the economy yielding a positive return on capital,
the further in the future an economic burden (here,
emissions reduction) lies, the smaller is the set
of resources that must be set aside today to fmance
the burden.
2. Capital Stock. Stock for energy production and
use is typically long-lived (for example, power
plant, housing and transport). . . . Time is
therefore needed to reoptimize the capital stock.
3. Technical progress. There is ample evidence for
past and potential improvements in the efficiency
of energy supply, transformation and end-use
technologies. Thus, the availability of low-carbon
substitutes will probably improve and their costs
drop over time. 33

The Geneva Ministerial Declaration states that
the IPCC's report "provides a scientific basis for

Some scientists agree that to act immediately
and urgently, as the Ministerial Declaration advocates, would be premature. William Nierenberg of
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the Scripps Institute of Oceanography said in testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Science ,
There is no question in my mind that the current
anthropogenic growth of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere is bound to influence climate ... [but]
one can now safely wait . . . before taking action. 34
Conclusion
The United States is backing into a basic change
in its global warming policy without the national
debate that an issue of this magnitude warrants. A
speech by an under secretary of state is hardly the
appropriate vehicle for a polar shift in governmental policy on such a major issue.

Congressional committees with appropriate jurisdiction should immediately schedule intensive
hearings on the sudden shift in official United States
global warming policy.
Several key points deserve substantial public
airing:
1. Does the degree of scientific certainty about
the threat of global warming outweigh the
heavy costs carbon-mitigation efforts will
impose on the American economy?

a well-ordered debate on global climate change before a treaty is established. Because the U.S. delegation is the driving force behind these negotiations,
the public and its congressional representatives
should have a hand in guiding the process.
To this end, Congress should hold intensive
hearings soon, preferably prior to the next meeting
of the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate in December 1996, at which time the specific restrictions are likely to be put forth. Certainly such
hearings should be held before the next Conference
of Parties meeting in December 1997. Merely to
state that Congress would have the opportunity to
rule on a final version of a treaty is unsatisfactory
because it will then be too late to modify the agreement. At that late stage, Congress would be limited
to an up or down vote.
International global climate change policy is
likely to have more widespread effects on the people
and the economy of the United States than many of
the issues that now occupy a more central stage in
Washington. Congress should act now to frame and
to guide the international debate on global climate
change before international agreements become set
in the stone of international law.

2. Has the administration carefully examined
the economic consequences of its global
warming policy? Effects on economic
growth, employment, inflation, international
competition, income distribution, regional
economics, and specific industries each require study.
3. Has the administration determined how it
will limit greenhouse gas emissions? What
specific mechanisms will be used?
4. What was the basis for the dramatic shift in
policy? What policy process or procedure
was followed?
Americans should have the opportunity to hear
12
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